O presente trabalho tem como fio condutor mostrar a importância dos profetas e dos santos no Masnavi de Rumi – místico da tradição Islâmica Sufi, nascido em Vakhsh, nas cercanias de Balkh atual Afeganistão, em 1207. Para Rumi os profetas e santos são instrumentos de comunicação entre Deus e suas criaturas. Muito além de figuras históricas, profetas e santos atualizam a mensagem e trazem para o mundo fenomênico os sutis influxos do numinoso. O presente estudo parte da linhagem de Adão (...) e passando pelos diversos profetas comuns às tradições monoteístas culmina com a figura de Mohammad. Da mesma maneira, os santos que a tradição islâmica celebra como pontes entre os mundos e mensageiros que atualizam a mensagem divina têm para Rumi a força de serem enviados que podem ser vistos e ouvidos sintetizando os ensinamentos eternos em vivências temporais atualizadas. Para Rumi a importância dos profetas e dos santos se revela nos traços marcantes que cada um deles adquire e que os reveste como enviados e amigos de Deus, pontes atualizadas de uma mensagem eterna e perene. Por este motivo, Rumi concita cada discípulo e crente a escutar a mensagem dos profetas e a visitar os santos a fim de atualizar os segredos teofânicos de Deus. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende traçar alguns aspectos concernentes à importância do conceito de coração na mística Islâmica (sufismo), tendo como base a obra de Rumi, intitulada Masnavi. O coração, como conceito técnico no sufismo, possui uma gama vasta de significados que compõem como que um mosaico para a apreensão do conhecimento místico. Purificar o coração é torná-lo órgão de recepção dos mistérios do Amado, é purgá-lo de tudo aquilo que obscureça o conhecimento. Palavras-chave: Masnavi; Rumi; Coração; Teofania; Metaconhecimento; Mística islâmica; (...) Sufismo. ABSTRACT The present article aims at tracing some aspects on the importance of the concept of heart in Mystical Islamism (Sufism), using as the foundation the work of Rãm§, entitled Masnavi. The heart, as a technical concept in Sufism, possesses a vast range of meanings which compose it as a mosaic to be apprehended in mystical knowledge. Through the purification of the heart, it becomes the organ for receiving the mysteries of the Loved One, and it is purged of all that darkens knowledge. Key words: Masnavi; Rumi; Heart; Theophany; Aim knowledge; Mystical islamism; Sufism. (shrink)

As cidades brasileiras contemporâneas possuem espaços que ora privilegiam a realização de negócios e ora a construção de cidadania. Para compreender como são ocupados destes modos se faz necessário analisar as cidades; desde sua definição, passando pelo contexto político e econômico, para então compreender seu aspecto social. Assim, este artigo busca compreender se e em que medida as características dos espaços públicos impactam no processo de construção de cidadania. Analisando por meio de observação flutuante dois espaços públicos que são duas (...) praças urbanas centrais, localizadas em duas cidades no mesmo contexto metropolitanos. Perpassa-se pelo debate regional com o intuito de evidenciar que os conflitos são equivalentes nas diversas escalas; contudo a demonstração do contexto da Região Metropolitana do Vale do Paraíba e Litoral Norte/SP, objetiva tornar evidente que as estruturas físicas locais, dos espaços públicos urbanos centrais não direcionam as relações sociais e suas disputas, mas são um meio e resultado dessas. (shrink)

Estudo histórico-crítico sobre a relação entre Direito, Educação e Política, desenvolvido a partir de fontes teóricas do Brasil e de Portugal sobre o tema da Educação em Direitos Humanos. Investiga as origens econômicas, políticas e sociais identitárias dos Estados brasileiro e português, a partir da intrínseca relação existente entre o processo de colonização e a contraditória transformação das sociedades nos respectivos períodos de redemocratização, alcançados no final do século XX. Apresenta a luta pelos Direitos Humanos, no Brasil e em Portugal, (...) através de mediações institucionais e acadêmicas. Destaca a pesquisa em Direitos Humanos como promissora prática social nos dois países. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como principal objetivo analisar e discutir questões acerca de como à educação muitas vezes acaba por contribuir para o aumento das desigualdades sociais. Desse modo, através dessa análise pretende-se ainda destacar as contribuições e críticas do pensamento de Pierre Félix Bourdieu, Paul- Michel Foucault e Karl Marx sobre os problemas sociais que permeiam a sociedade desde o século XIX até os dias atuais e muitas vezes são fortalecidos pelos sistemas educacionais.

Resumen:Para nadie debe ser tan difícil reconocer que Chile transita por un período de profunda incertidumbre respecto de su destino. Los resultados del pasado 4 de septiembre del año 2022 y 7 de mayo del 2023 son tan erráticos respecto de los anteriores que pareciera que el curso de nuestra política nacional no estuviese gobernado por ningún principio discernible. Al intentar explicarlos, los apasionados culpan a los excesos de la izquierda y otros, al sabotaje de la derecha. Pero esta clase (...) de posturas que intentan reducir el problema a una sola causa autoevidente no permiten ponderar ningún significado posible de lo que ocurrió. Lo mismo aplica para aquellas descripciones de escenarios líquidos donde la multiplicidad de causas se vuelven ininteligibles, diluyendo cualquier explicación como si se tratara de agua escurriendo entre los dedos. Bajo tales condiciones, es imposible afirmar que nos encontramos perdidos o no, pues carecemos de un norte, una dirección, un estándar por el cual evaluar las acciones individuales y colectivas. Y esta situación no solo es aplicable para quienes han intentado ofrecer explicaciones cultas al problema, pues tanto la anomia cada vez más extendida en la población como la confusión de la élite son evidencia de que todos carecemos de una adecuada apreciación del significado de los eventos que han transcurrido durante los últimos años. (shrink)

Para nadie debe ser tan difícil reconocer que Chile transita por un período de profunda incertidumbre respecto de su destino. Los resultados del pasado 4 de septiembre del año 2022 y 7 de mayo del 2023 son tan erráticos respecto de los anteriores que pareciera que el curso de nuestra política nacional no estuviese gobernado por ningún principio discernible. Al intentar explicarlos, los apasionados culpan a los excesos de la izquierda y otros, al sabotaje de la derecha. Pero esta clase (...) de posturas que intentan reducir el problema a una sola causa autoevidente no permiten ponderar ningún significado posible de lo que ocurrió. Lo mismo aplica para aquellas descripciones de escenarios líquidos donde la multiplicidad de causas se vuelven ininteligibles, diluyendo cualquier explicación como si se tratara de agua escurriendo entre los dedos. Bajo tales condiciones, es imposible afirmar que nos encontramos perdidos o no, pues carecemos de un norte, una dirección, un estándar por el cual evaluar las acciones individuales y colectivas. Y esta situación no solo es aplicable para quienes han intentado ofrecer explicaciones cultas al problema, pues tanto la anomia cada vez más extendida en la población como la confusión de la élite son evidencia de que todos carecemos de una adecuada apreciación del significado de los eventos que han transcurrido durante los últimos años. (shrink)

Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

The text deals with the concept of representation in its relation to the concept and sovereignty, in Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The work studied is Leviathan, of 1651. The research presents that sovereignty is founded through the original legal act, which establishes an artificial person to represent everyone. This artificial thing is the State. The political society, however, is different from its government, although they are functionally the same.

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

Psychiatric examinations in official institutions of the Brazilian government include examinations of individual convicts – some of whom are highly dangerous – carried out by court decision. These individuals are taken handcuffed under police escort from penitentiaries to the examination site. In most Brazilian states, medical examiners or experts adopt the basic procedure of asking the police officers to remove the handcuffs from the convict for the examination to be carried out. This article analyzes, from the bioethical standpoint, the behavior (...) of 49 forensic psychiatrists in eight Brazilian states in relation to procedures adopted as protection measures against any possible danger posed by their examinees. In the context of a developing country, where sophisticated protection means are not available, the practice of keeping convicts handcuffed during such examinations is compared to other measures and more advisable alternatives are discussed from the ethical standpoint. Considering the dilemma between showing minimum respect for the autonomy of examinees and ensuring the security of examiners, the need to adopt equitable procedures based on the recognition of the different needs of examiners and examinees is addressed. (shrink)

Este artigo busca apresentar as fenomenologias de Husserl e de Heidegger não como dois caminhos isolados na construção do que ulteriormente representou a tradição fenomenológica, mas, ao contrário, identificando pontos de intersecção entre estes dois autores. Para isso recorre ao texto Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie, de Heidegger, publicado em 1963, no qual o já septuagenário filósofo recorre ao seu itinerário pessoal junto à fenomenologia e ao quanto a obra e, posteriormente, a figura de Husserl se mostrariam marcantes na elaboração (...) de seu pensamento – desde suas iniciais intuições como estudante de teologia, passando pelos primeiros anos como professor universitário e culminando na publicação de Sein und Zeit. O reconhecimento deste itinerário exige, porquanto, que a obra de Heidegger seja enxergada em sua relação com a fenomenologia husserliana, donde não apenas recebera o método necessário para a instauração de uma ontologia fundamental, mas a radicalidade inerente à própria atividade filosofante, isto é, o direcionamento às coisas mesmas (Sache selbst) e, por ele, à essência do pensamento, à coisa do pensar (Sache des Denkens). (shrink)

Tyler Burge is famous for defending primitivist naturalism about mental representations, according to which mental representations are primitive natural states. Primitivist naturalism contrasts with semantic reductionism, according to which mental representations are reducible to more fundamental natural states. Burge developed the most compelling and influential attack on semantic reductionism from a primitivist naturalist point of view. My goal in this paper is to defend semantic reduc- tionism from Burge’s attack. I assess and refute his objection to the motivations for semantic (...) reductionism and his objection to the semantic reductionist theory that he takes to be the most promising one, namely, teleosemantics. I argue that in spite of the ingenuity of Burge’s objections, they fail to show that there is no motivation for taking representational states as reducible to more fundamental natural states or that the core thesis of teleosemantics is flawed. (shrink)

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which (...) his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. (shrink)

pt. I. Matter: 1. Philosophy as worldview ; 2. Classical matter: bodies and fields ; 3. Quantum matter: weird but real ; 4. General concept of matter: to be is to become ; 5. Emergence and levels ; 6. Naturalism ; 7. Materialism -- pt. II. Mind: 8. The mind-body problem ; 9. Minding matter: the plastic brain ; 10. Mind and society ; 11. Cognition, consciousness, and free will ; 12. Brain and computer: the hardware/software dualism ; 13. Knowledge: (...) genuine and bogus -- pt. III. Appendices: 14. Appendix A: Objects ; 15. Appendix B. Truths. (shrink)

We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testimony. (...) The distinction is that between somebody’s functioning as a ‘good informant’ and their functioning merely as a ‘source of information’. The difference between these has, as he remarks, a crucial ethical aspect: What I have in mind is the special flavour of situations in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose, rather than as objects from which services, in this case true belief, can be extracted. In this paper I shall try to bring out the distinctive nature of the role of good informant in a way that helps to clarify what is at stake in asking whether there can be group testimony in the sense of genuinely collective testimony—that is to say, where the group testifier is a collective and not merely a sum of individuals testifying in one or another form of aggregated chorus. (shrink)

Este texto pretende desenvolver a tese de que o principal interlocutor de Sócrates em A República, Glauco, irmão de Platão, revela qualidades semelhantes àquelas que serão exigidas dos guardiões e do futuro filósofo e governante da cidade construída na argumentação de Sócrates e seus interlocutores. Procura-se mostrar que isso pode ser encontrado em diversos momentos do diálogo. Pretende-se também extrair algumas consequências para a própria compreensão desse diálogo e da filosofia platônica como um todo.

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 This text develops some philosophical analyses on the complex and rich relationship between skepticism and dogmatism, and has as its starting point Plínio Smith's view expressed in his paper "Dogmatic Skepticism and Dogmatism without Dogmas", which critically discussed some texts I wrote on that subject. My main aim he re is to reconsider a problem noted by him in his paper, and, based on this, to advance some new ideas for a critical position on skepticism.

Inicialmente, considera-se como as possibilidades de relações entre a psicanálise e a filosofia de Peirce têm sido objeto de trabalhos de filósofos e psicanalistas. São destacadas as noções de Winnicott sobre os objetos e fenômenos transicionais e o brincar, como uma área de particular interesse para o estudo dessas relações, dadas suas ligações com a filosofia de Peirce. É, então, indicado como Winnicott faz referência às relações da simbolização com os objetos e fenômenos transicionais e indica como um “full understanding” (...) dos processos de simbolização podem contribuir para o conhecimento desses fenômenos. Considerando essa manifestação de Winnicott, é examinado de que modo a semiótica de Peirce contém elementos que auxiliam o entendimento do que é chamado de “simbolização”, por Winnicott. Assim,, também permitindo a discriminação dos aspectos semióticos presentes nos objetos e fenômenos transicionais e no brincar, permitindo, assim, uma ampliação de algumas dimensões da significação das concepções de Winnicott. As questões referidas são examinadas amplamente nos casos clínicos de “Edmund” e “Diana”, citados por Winnicott e em outras duas situações clínicas apresentadas pelo autor. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the (...) powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed. (shrink)

Since the famous passage in which Socrates (Plato 38a5-6) says that the unexamined, and therefore non-reflected, life is not worth living, “reflection” has been a diffuse and iterant term in ethics, moral philosophy, epistemology, political philosophy, but also in psychology. This volume opens a new perspective on the topic of reflection, considering the most recent approaches in both philosophy (namely in epistemology ) and cultural psychology.